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Text, Textuality and Interpretation 
An Interview with Michael Riffaterre 
Mishra: Professor Riffaterre, let me begin by asking: in your writings 
and in your recent lectures, you tend to give an almost mystical primacy to 
the text. The text, in other words, is more or less the ultimate source of 
authority and my question is, why are you so sure of this? 
Riffaterre: The text is a given. Criticism and literary theory would 
have no raison d'etre if there were no text. They are a reflection on a 
reading experience. Texts have no mystical primacy. They are factual, 
concrete starting points, the most basic elemental feature of what we call 
literature. I will not except even oral literature; oral literature (a 
contradiction in terms, etymologically) exhibits the same kind of 
permanence and regularity that we observe in the text. To put it otherwise, 
oral literature is characterised by repeatability: the successive oral 
renditions of the score of an oral story or poem regularly run the gamut of 
basically unchanging components in an unchanging order. They follow a 
memorised model as faithfully as if the recitant were reading, except for 
some points he may gloss or expatiate upon. Thus I am not trying to give 
greater importance to the text, but simply to point out that the text is 
physically present first, or it is presupposed. 
It takes me immediately to perhaps a very simple question- do you 
presuppose a definition of a text? 
When we speak of presuppositions, we refer to what comes to the 
mind of a reader. As your question is phrased, it would have to be 
answered in terms of reader perception or reader response. Without going 
into this in detail, we can say that texts are susceptible of definition because 
there are a number of features that recur from text to text. I know of no 
literary text that does not have at least some of these features. I submit we 
must identify these features as universals of literariness. When there are 
variations, they belong to another level, that of generic features. 
Depending on the genre a text can be associated with, or be representative 
of, their number varies. Generic features are not necessarily universals. 
Rather they define specific modes of actualising the universals. The latter 
make it possible to define minimally a text. 
But my real reason for underscoring the importance of the text is that 
its very textuality must be counted among the universals. It is a fact of 
experience that phrases, sentences, words can be found anywhere, 
everywhere, that present some aspects of literariness. They are sensed as 
literary, or as giving their context, their verbal environment, a literary 
flavour. In any culture, any user of a language will recognise such verbal 
components, which can be identified as literary, even though some may 
vary from one culture to another. These components, however, are not in 
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themselves sufficient to create literariness. They are elements of discourse, 
or fragments that appear in non-literary contexts, in newspaper articles, 
for instance, or in conversation, and they may evidence all other universals 
of literariness without yet being literary works of art. Only textuality 
achieves that; a partial quotation from literature, for example, is literary to 
some extent but not a work of art. We have to find a way to differentiate 
the work of art from those linguistic sequences that contain literary 
elements, to differentiate literature from literary discourse. The solution I 
propose is textuality. You may have all the other features, all the other 
universals, but if you don't have textuality, then you still do not have 
literature. Even a fragment is understood as something extracted from a 
text, or presupposing a text. A quotation, or a literary allusion also 
presuppose a text. Literature begins at the level of the text. Or better, the 
text (not the words, the trope or the sentence) is the basic unit ofliterature. 
So then, when you speak about textuality, are you really talking about 
the literariness of the text? 
I am referring to the function of the text as a unit of literature rather 
than to its function as a grammatical entity, as a sequence of sentences, or 
as a succession of meanings. Text refers to a linguistic entity, textuality to 
this entity as a factor relevant to the literary manipulation of language. 
Since most texts do not function as literary units, I would say that a text 
cannot embody textuality unless -it be characterised by closure, by 
overdetermination, and by the fact that it is one unit of significance. 
This doesn't stop a fragment from being a text though. 
No, but a fragment is a mutilated text. It is a text without a beginning 
and without an end, or a beginning bereft of what it should introduce, or an 
ending that has lost that which led to it. 
Would you say that the concept of "textuality"- as a unit of 
significance or whatever- does not impose any limit on the size of a text? 
A text could take the form of a two-line poem or an eighteen-book epic. 
Yes, of course. A text may be very short. In fact, certain literary genres 
demand brevity: in these, one of the generic features which I mentioned 
before is that the text must be brief. Aphorisms and maxims belong in that 
category. Of course, it is not enough to speak of a few sentences. Brevity is 
combined with other elements: for instance, not only must the text be pithy 
but it must make a point with a sharp, unexpected twist. Another such 
genre, I suppose, would be the distich in Greek and Latin literature. The 
elegiac distich was truly a genre, since it had an ethos in that only certain 
topics were possible, and since there was a link between the metric 
characteristics of the distich and what it expressed. 
It takes me to a related question arising out of the kinds of definitions 
you have given to the text. Some people would claim that given that kind of 
a position, theory is nothing more than a parasitic exercise. It's a parasite 
on a text and it must always be parasitic without any claims to any quasi-
philosophical autonomy of its own. 
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Well I don't know about the philosophical autonomy. I don't know 
about autonomy, period. Theory is parasitic only if it could be said that the 
reader is parasitic to the text. I don't think that it is a proper view, for both 
reader and text are essential and inseparable. Theory is rather a different 
way of approaching literature. Criticism is the evaluative, sometimes 
normative, way of approaching it. A critic is supposed to tell people why 
they should like or dislike a literary piece. I find this a very daring attitude, 
and I admire those people who can glibly say: this is good, this is bad. This 
kind of assertion plays an important role in the teaching of literature. 
Rather than a cognitive procedure, literary criticism is a behavioural 
reaction to literature or any other art. 
Now you have philology, which purports to examine the physical 
features of texts, whether these features are literary or not, and the way 
texts ate bequeathed from one generation to another. All this is quite 
important but not germane to the study of literature's literariness. 
Theory is entirely different. First, theory focuses on relevancy. 
Second, it addressses very general problems - problems that transcend 
genres, aesthetic schools or movements. It tries to define, for example, 
under what conditions a literary text survives the disappearance of its first 
readers, of the civilisation that gave rise to it, and of the aesthetic system 
that made it acceptable. Theory also considers the text's survival despite 
conflicts or incompatibilities among the various ideological inter-
pretations to which it is open. Theory's final step in this connection is to 
determine what in the text is left that is basic, not residual, once we 
discount external conditions and the idiosyncrasies of response. 
It is necessary to adopt a theoretical point of view because the 
fashionable word in criticism, "approaches," is tainted by its national or 
historical origins. Approaches are ideologically oriented. It has been 
suggested, quite wrongly, that theory too is ideologically oriented because 
it is said to reflect an ideology of no choice among ideologies. On the 
contrary, theory considers all possible choices, and the point at which they 
cease to be relevant. Theory also tries to determine at what point the text 
ceases to be literary, or whether there is such a point. It also seeks to 
discover the point at which a text begins to be literary, assuming that our 
perception of literariness is a progressive experience. All these questions 
are best examined by going beyond the hie et nunc of the literary event. 
. Otherwise (and this has been the sad story of literary history) we tend to 
substitute history for literary history, and literary history for the study of 
permanent aspects of literature. 
Well, we started off by talking about the issue, or the claim, that could 
be made about the parasitic nature of theory; but related to it, you raised a 
very interesting problematic, and that's the relation between criticism and 
theory itself. The claim you made is that criticism is primarily evaluative-
it's a question of judgement and taste - and that theory is more like a 
description of systems. 
It is an attempt to determine what systems are possible, and a 
description of actual systems - including the systems known as literary 
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criticism. If theory is to be consistent with its aims, it also has to explain 
and predict the behaviour of any type of reader, and therefore that of the 
literary critic as well. The literary critic is, after all, a glorified reader- or 
should be one: a reader with the range that enables him to compare works 
of literature in a comparison that may even go beyond the limits of what 
has been thus far or is now accepted as literature. So theory should be able 
to find a place for the critic in its scheme, to teach the reader the following: 
what happens to the literary text when a critic goes after it; what happens 
to the critic himself when he reads a text; the areas of justifiable criticism; 
the areas of gratuitous criticism; when we can say the criticism is parasitic, 
and when legitimate. Theory can even ask whether or not a critic has a 
defensible right to pan a work of art. 
But in the teaching profession, do you see criticism and theory as two 
different ways of examining texts? 
Two different phases, or stages, in the process. It would be a good 
thing for anyone who has anything to do with literature, or is in the 
teaching profession, to take a healthy dose of theory. That is certainly what 
we are trying to do at Columbia, where we created general courses of 
literature that have nothing to do with the teaching of literature within the 
"national" departments: Eastern languages, French, German, and so on. 
Nor do these courses have anything to do with the teaching of comparative 
literature. Comparative literature tends to compare specifics. Theory does 
use a comparative method, but not in order to come back to the particulars 
of a given text. It uses it to arrive at an abstract, generalised view of a 
system. By the way, theory should ultimately encompass comparative 
literature, since comparative literature comprises, in not quite equal terms, 
literary history and evaluative criticism. 
But what happens to the kinds of claims that are made by, say, 
traditional English Departments, where professors claim that they are 
critics and therefore what they're doing is a study of individual texts? When 
they say, "We evaluate texts, we show students how to make similar kinds 
of judgements about texts," are they mistaken? 
They are not mistaken in their aims. They certainly are mistaken when 
they believe that it is enough to be a "practitioner" to get somewhere: a 
mere pragmatic association with literature yields relevant explanations 
only by chance. Many teachers explain a text or build an evaluation of an 
author on principles that are valid for sociology or social history, or 
history in general, without ever asking whether these principles are 
applicable to this special being that is a text. A text can be defined from the 
viewpoint of the historian and from the viewpoint of the literary historian. 
But very few people bother to ponder the difference between the two 
viewpoints. Fewer still bother to ask whether the principle, the definitions 
of something in history, must be or can be applied to literature without 
some adjustment. One obvious difference is that the historical viewpoint 
still popular in so many Departments of Literature is not consistent with 
the ordinary reader's actual experience of the texts. If the reader is properly 
cued in this traditional philosophy, he will be influenced by the historical 
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approach. Reading a text in the light of a tradition, he will be looking for 
traits corresponding to a classical period, or periods of decay and then of 
renewal. These preconceptions are bound to hide the real nature of a text, 
its intrinsic inalienable traits. 
But if the reader is estranged from the teaching orthodoxy, or if that 
orthodoxy some day collapses, as happens time and again, he will find that 
literature still endures. Quite a few "natural" readers arrive at a full 
enjoyment of literature without ever puzzling to know who came first and 
on whom the anxiety of influence exerted itself (something especially true 
of readers reading a literature other than that to which they were exposed 
at school). This is one of the strongest reasons for finding the traditional 
approach to literature a limited one. I am not saying that it is necessarily 
obsolete, but that it is narrow, and sometimes dangerously so. The 
traditional teaching of literature tends to substitute the author for the text, 
or the period for the text, or the social class for the text, or any kind of 
discipline or approach for the experience of literature proper. 
But surely American New Criticism didn't do that. American New 
Criticism is talking about the text. Well, let's go to the other extreme, of 
ignoring certain periods altogether. 
In giving greater importance to the text, the New Critics tended to 
ignore the relationship between text and reader. This has been corrected, 
to some extent, by the development of reader response criticism, which I 
initiated in this country. I didn't even know I was first, and had to wait for 
Stanley Fish one day to say publicly that a 1959 paper of mine was indeed 
the starting point.! The New Critics' contribution can never be 
exaggerated. But they did paint themselves into a corner by refusing to 
consider the pre-eminent role of the reader. The reader comes very close to 
replacing the author, and yet he cannot come into his own except within 
the text's constraints. So you have a dialectical relationship that cannot be 
ignored. 
You made the remark that your work has taken into account 
reception aesthetics, reader responses and so forth, and yet you talk mainly 
about the ordinary reader. You do not give that reader any kind of 
descriptive category as such, or even a name. I don't recall in your works 
the reader acquiring a name like the implied reader, or the competent 
reader, and so forth. 
Again in my 1959 paper I had proposed the concept of the superreader 
(archi/ecteur), and I used it as late as in the 1966 paper that triggered a 
controversy with Jakobson and Levi-Strauss about Baudelaire's poem on 
"Les Chats. "2 It was not a real reader. In fact, I gave up the name, if not the 
practice, because I felt it was a misleading misnomer, for it seemed to 
suggest that there could be a superior or good reader. Actually the name 
referred to a heuristic system, a purely conventional tool of exploration for 
temporary use only, since it was limited to a preliminary stage of decoding. 
It was meant to enable critics and theorists alike to collect facts about the 
text and, in so doing, to go beyond the limitations of a single reading, or the 
idiosyncratic quirks of an isolated reader. I would collect a number of 
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readings for a text and I would list the pqints in that text that elicited 
reactions. Then I would dismiss the contents of the reactions and keep only 
the list of the passages to which readers had reacted. Instead of having 
reactions to points spread, evenly or not, throughout the text, I found they 
were concentrated on certain spots, indicating where the structures surface 
in the guise of devices that compelled the natural reader's attention, that 
controlled and guided his decoding of the text's message. My next step was 
to describe these devices and determine the rules governing them. Once the 
rules are found, the devices can be identified analytically, without having 
to resort to empirical but cumbersome scanning. What you have, in effect, 
is a reader who keeps reading. Even though the superreader was only a 
scanning procedure, it approximated actual reading. It did very quickly 
what a natural reader does slowly when he keeps reading and rereading, 
when he discovers relations with other texts. He then reaches the level of 
intertextual reading and becomes capable of integrating his culture, 
whether personal or national, into his reading. All these stages are subject 
to rules that are constant and affect all speakers of a language. Thus 
anybody is capable of reading properly, without the benefit of formal 
training. Of course, not everybody is capable of explaining, or even 
becoming aware of, the procedures he instinctively follows. 
But this takes me back to a question I asked. Are you now content 
therefore with a kind of common reader, a common reader though who is 
capable of doing the next thing? 
A reader is a person capable of reading a text in its totality by relying 
entirely on his linguistic competence- a linguistic competence similar to, 
if not necessarily equal to, that of the author. 
This reader is not inscribed in the text at all? 
The reader certainly is controlled by the text. I am not sure what it 
means to say that he is inscribed in the text. 
I mean is there a specific reader who not so much controls, but who is 
a kind of ideal recipient of the text, so that the text is actually speaking to 
that ideal reader and that the act of reading, therefore, is to read the text 
mediated by the ideal reader to whom the text is speaking? This would be 
true of texts which have a class bias, which are meant for a particular class, 
which have the language of that class, etc. Yes, I was simply talking about 
the way in which, shall we say, a particular language formation in the text 
presupposes an ideal reader and the only way in which we can therefore 
read that text is through the mediation of this ideal reader. In other words, 
becoming the ideal reader of that text. 
Well, I don't know what an ideal reader looks like. Suppose the ideal 
reader were someone whose linguistic competence reflects the same social 
structures as the text. How could we know? How would we know that our 
reading comes close to this ideal reader? I can think of one case where the 
text imposes a certain type of reading: when the text visibly omits certain 
elements, we must then complete what is missing. This compulsory filling-
in catches the reader in a framework of representations and makes him 
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perform the textual score more faithfully, thus more ideally, than would be 
the case if the text made explicit everything and did the work for him. One 
of my recent papers deals with hermeneutic models that are precisely such 
constraints, denying the reader the luxury of superficial reading, or of a 
reading which allows him to take his pick.3 
You have spoken about words, for instance, which are permanently 
poetic. That's a concept that escapes me at times. How could you defend 
the idea that words are permanently poetic - there are certain words 
which are permanently correct? 
I don't defend it. I am simply stating a fact of literary life in some 
societies where words are deemed poetic by virtue of a convention. They 
are not permanently poetic in the sense that no matter where they occur 
they would elicit a feeling recognised, or rationalised, as "poeticity." They 
are permanently poetic in the sense that if they are given prominence and 
are valorised or activated by context, then it will look as if their poetic 
value came from outside the text, as if this value depended not on the sign 
itself but on the external, non-verbal object it refers to. An example of this 
phenomenon can be found in descriptive poetry, where convention has 
singled out moments in time (dawn, sunset, midnight) and places 
(summits, promontories, vantage points, and their opposites, vales and 
dales); the words designating them come to form the nuclei in clusters of 
themes and motifs, places become topoi. Hence the formation of a 
prepoeticised lexicon. The poeticity of it, however, still has to be activated 
by the context, and conversely can be cancelled out by it. 
I get the feeling that a text is ultimately a transformation in your 
system of a fundamental opposition which takes the form of either x versus 
y, or a and not b. 
That is close to what I have in mind, yes. I don't know that the two 
formulas you just posited would take care of all cases, but you are not off 
the mark. Generally speaking, I hold that a matrix owes its generative 
power to its being paradoxical; it puts together extreme opposites that the 
sociolect keeps apart, or it puts asunder members of indissoluble dyads 
that normally make sense together only (like a predicate and its subject, a 
proposition and its presuppositions). Derivations from a matrix are bound 
therefore to depart from ordinary usage, and to produce indirection of 
meaning in ways not limited to the elementary polarity of figurative and 
literal. 
What I am really trying to get at is to what extent is this not a feature 
of very early, almost primitive structuralism? 
This does not bother me. If literary phenomena are best described in 
structural terms, so be it. What I would like to say, however, is that I 
separate completely the notion of structure from any ideology attached to 
the structuralist label. And if the prevailing view in structuralism is that the 
relationship between a structural invariant and its variants is static, I reject 
that aspect of structuralism also. This is where semiotics takes over, since it 
recognises only transformations ad infinitum, the continuous or unlimited 
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semiosis that inspired Peirce's triadic model: for a sign to have meaning, it 
has to refer to an object (another sign, rather than a "thing") by means of 
another representation, the interpretant, which is yet another sign. And the 
interpretant in turn requires a similar system in order to be understood. 
Hence an ultimate circularity that covers an entire semantic field. A text, 
from variant to variant, from interpretant to interpretant, brings the reader 
back to its matrix, and this beginning then demands to be verified anew by 
rereading, since the reader is confronting anew the initial puzzlement. 
You have said that the matrix never really occurs in the surface text 
itself 
It appears only through successive actualisations. The exception 
seems to be irony, in which the parodying text must have as its matrix a 
representation that is already a surface phenomenon, the parodied text. 
But what is the status of the matrix? Is it nothing more than a set of 
abstractions which hasn't been semanticised? 
It is indeed a minimal and literal hypothetical sentence, that the text 
actualises by developing it into a periphrasis or a series of periphrases. 
Since these make use of other representations, they are not necessarily 
figurative. Their link to the matrix is found at the semic level: a sememe is 
nothing but an inchoate sentence, as Umberto Eco puts it. There are 
instances where the matrix is just such an inchoate sentence, but one made 
productive by the self-contradictory cancellation of a seme or by the 
replacement of a seme with its reverse. The text then is literally an effort to 
actualise verbally this semantic outrage, in order to come to terms with it, in 
order to make it acceptable or imaginable through a series of represent-
ations, which in turn will raise other difficulties, further challenge 
sociolectically accepted equivalencies or synonymies, and keep the reader 
on his toes. The basic mechanism is the interplay of opposites at the semic 
level. 
You mean like evil and non-evil? 
Yes. Evil is a bit large, but let's say femininity as opposed to masc-
ulinity, solidity as opposed to fluidity. 
Let me ask you about your own antecedents. Are there theoreticians 
you feel indebted to? Kristeva perhaps, Lotman more likely? And, of 
course, Bakhtin? 
The two scholars from Russia rather than Kristeva. Kristeva was only 
an intermediary, but the first ones to hit upon the notion of intertextuality 
were Lotman and Bakhtin. 
If I were to ask you to comment on the advance the Semiotics of 
Poetry made on The Structure of the Artistic Text, where would you locate 
the advance?4 
In the concept of mobility, of a constantly changing perception of the 
text which explains why a text never ceases to be active: the fact that a 
reader can never verify his interpretation, his perception of "significance" 
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without rereading at the level of "meaning", a process that exposes him 
again to the same difficulties he encountered at first, to the same 
incompi!tibilities between the sociolect and the text's idiolect that can be 
solved only at the level of significance. Bakhtin deserves a place in the 
pantheon of great men. If I were to say something critical about the 
Russian formalists and the Tartu semioticians, it is that with the exception 
of Bakhtin, their reading of texts is not as good as their theory. The success 
of any theory lies in its practice, the proof of the pudding. 
To what extent are you conscious of yourself as a product of a 
particular moment in history - a particular moment in history that 
reflects a conjunction of structuralism and semiotics and an acceptance by 
academics and intellectuals of that conjunction? In other words, would 
Professor Riffaterre survive history or is he not simply yet another product 
of historical conjunctions? 
Obviously, whatever results I may have achieved have been made 
possible by a combination of circumstances and by historical conditions. 
In my case, it was mostly a matter of where I was working- the fact that I 
left the French academic scene where I would most likely have been 
silenced for this country where people are more tolerant intellectually. The 
pressure of orthodoxy is less stifling here than anywhere else. 
America, I take it, redeems history. 
Exactly. 
It seems to me that in your analysis, you tend to give the impression of 
being an early deconstructionist. Let me cite a few examples. Many of your 
analyses deal with a word in a poem. Recently you have commented on 
"smokeless" in Wordsworth's "Earth has not anything to show more fair," 
"glazed" in William Carlos Williams' "The Red Wheelbarrow. "5 In 
Semiotics of Poetry you analyse Hugo's use of the Latin word tibicine. 
Now what I'm getting at is that deconstructionists may make the same 
claims about these words as you do by saying that these are precisely the 
words which rupture or fracture representation, and that the ideology and 
"organicity" and "univocality" of texts are being problematised or 
questioned. 
I take the opposite view: the words that challenge sociolectic 
acceptability increase the constraints and limitations upon possible 
interpretations. Deconstructionists however may chance upon the 
controlling words. 
You say "chance upon." You don't think that they would locate 
precisely such words. 
Even though they may find the relevant words, they are at a 
disadvantage when it comes to demonstrating that these are the right 
words indeed. The way to these words is dictated by the text. The text 
controls the reactions of the reader to a considerable extent. Instead of 
"fracturing" the text, these words propose another way of reading it. The 
ways of reading are not undecidable. The relevant words impose a most 
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decidable reading. Only it is different from what we expected. This is where 
I part company with deconstruction. I don't think that deciphering a text is 
ever an impossibility. Texts are built so as to be fully read, even though 
they may not lead us to this readily. 
My point really is, why should the deconstructionist locate precisely 
these words? 
Because these words are given such a preferential treatment by the 
text that it is really hard to be obdurate and not to see that there is 
something peculiar happening at this or that point of the verbal sequence. 
Fracturing occurs through intertextuality, in the conflict between text and 
intertext. 
Now the students of the sociology of literature too have complaints 
about your refusal to confront the ideological determinants of both 
criticism and reading. Is this just blindness on your part, or a conscious 
denial of the adequacy of sociological readings of literary texts? What I 
detect is a certain fetishisation of the aesthetic going on in your works. The 
whole question of the exacting and laborious nature of text production, 
the distribution and dissemination of literary texts within a "free" 
economy - these are features that do not emerge in vour discourse. 
It is not a conscious denial; it's a conscious postponement. Reintro-
ducing the ideological determinants should be a secondary, not a prim-
ary aspect of the reading process. I have no problem with normal readers. 
But when a critic tries, in the light of his own ideology, to force the text 
into a given frame, his approach seems to me to blind him to the reality 
of the text. These behavioural quirks are external to the text and therefore 
none of my concern. I do not claim to solve all problems. I fear however 
that those who practise the sociology of literature superimpose an 
ideological grid that prevents them from seeing whatever in the text does 
not fit their preconceptions. 
If you confess that there are certain things that you do not claim to 
solve, are any of these things major gaps that need to be solved? 
Yes, but at a secondary stage. Let's first explore how the text itself 
points to such gaps and prepares the reader for a specific conflict between 
his ideology and what the text propounds. 
Well, let me rephrase that in a slightly more succinct fashion. Would 
you say that literature has a social function or, somewhat more schem-
atically, is the conscience of civilisation? 
I don't know about civilisation. I know something about the 
sociolects, the mythological traces left by civilisation in language. I am 
concerned only with the language that a text uses. The text itself is what 
defines the relevance of critical activity. 
Finally, what of the future? What does Professor Riffaterre propose 
to do now? 
' 
I 
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Well, I propose to expand my exploration of intertextuality by 
focusing on works longer than poems. If a text puts constraints on reader 
reactions, one must explain why neither greater length nor complexity can 
weaken this hold the text has on interpretation. It seems to me the domain 
of the narrative is a likely place in which to find an answer to these 
questions. 
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